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Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we specify, estimate and simulate a
dynamic structural model of housing demand. Our model generalizes previous applied econometric
work by incorporating realistic features of the housing market including non-convex adjustment costs
from buying and selling a home, credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements and
uncertainty about the evolution of incomes and home prices. We argue that these features are critical
for capturing salient features of housing demand observed in the PSID. After estimating the model
we use it to simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well
as tightening credit. These experiments are motivated by the U.S. recession starting in December of
2007 that saw large falls in home prices, large negative income shocks for many households and tightening
credit standards. In the short run, relatively few households adjust their housing stock. Households
respond instead by reducing non-housing consumption and reducing wealth because they wish to avoid
losing their home and the associated adjustment costs. Households that adjust in the short run are those
hit with a series of bad shocks, such as a negative income shock and a home price decline. A larger
proportion of households do adjust their consumption in the long run, increasing their housing stock




























In this paper, we estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of consumer demand for
housing. We use this model to study how housing and non-housing demand will respond to
a collapse in home prices, decrease in incomes and a tightening of credit standards. Apart
from the direct impact on the housing market, our model has quantitative implications for the
size of the wealth eect of house price changes on nondurable consumption expenditures. The
evidence can thus shed light on whether the recent decline in home prices triggered a drop in
aggregate consumption demand and hence sparked the subsequent recession. Looking forward,
our results can serve as predictions for the possible consequences over a longer time horizon.
Over the past decade, housing prices have appreciated at a very fast rate compared to
historical standards. Between 1997 and 2006, the nationwide Case Shiller home price index has
more than doubled from 84 to 190. The rate of appreciation in certain U.S. cities was much
faster than the national average. However, home prices have recently fallen and there is little
evidence thus far that there will be a sharp recovery. Between the peak in 2006 Q2 and 2009 Q2
the nationwide index fell 30%. For the most hard hit cities, such as Miami, Detroit, San Diego,
Las Vegas, and Phoenix, prices have fallen between 45% and 55% as of June 2009. In addition,
due to the sharp decline in economic activity and a subsequent increase in the unemployment
rate household incomes have been falling signicantly. We will expose households in our model
to exactly these house and income declines.
The past two decades have also seen substantial changes in mortgage markets. The tra-
ditional 30 year xed rate mortgage is no longer the standard mortgage product. Since their
introduction in the early 1980's the adjustable rate mortgage had grown to a recent peak
of a 40% share of mortgage applications in 2005.1 In addition to adjustable rate mortgages,
there has been an expansion of the subprime mortgage market and other non-conforming loans.
These credit market innovations helped people with low credit quality become homeowners and
also allowed households to buy larger homes. However, it is now clear that the expansion of
subprime credit also had a downside. Approximately 15% of subprime loans are in default as of
August 2009, three times the rate in 2005.2 As a result, non-conforming mortgages have been
more dicult to obtain as lenders have tightened credit in the mortgage market.3 Our struc-
tural model is rich enough to trace out, in admittedly stylized way, the consequences for housing
and nondurable consumption allocations of a contraction of the availability to households of
debt collateralized by housing.
1Source: Freddie Mac annual ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) survey.
2Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
3According to the 2009 Freddie Mac annual ARM survey, the share of ARM applications is at an all time
low of 3%.
2In our structural model, a household solves a life cycle dynamic programming problem. In
each period, households make investment decisions in housing, choose non-housing consump-
tion levels, and make decisions regarding mortgage borrowing and savings. Unlike a typical
investment vehicle, housing provides a ow of services that enters utility along with non-housing
consumption. We include additional realistic features of housing demand in the model. Ad-
justing the stock of housing requires the consumer to incur transaction costs meant to capture
realtor fees and other costs related to buying and selling a home. This gives rise to a lumpy
pattern in housing investment. The model also includes credit constraints in the form of mini-
mum down payment requirements for mortgages. We adopt a partial equilibrium approach by
modeling the evolution of income and home prices as exogenous rst order Markov processes.
We estimate the structural parameters of our model using household level data on income
and housing tenure decisions from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Estimating
a fully dynamic model of housing demand is technically challenging; solving the household's
dynamic programming problem is computationally dicult because of two key types of non-
convexities. First, housing demand has discontinuities arising from transaction costs to adjust
housing stocks. Second, households may face credit constraints because conforming mortgages
typically require a 20% down payment. As a result, it is not possible to characterize optimal
decisions using Euler equations, nor are we able to use standard GMM methods to estimate
the structural parameters.
Instead, we use the multistep method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, Levin (2007) (hereafter
BBL) to estimate the model. The rst step of BBL requires us to estimate housing decisions
rules and the law of motion for the state variables. We use a multinomial logit model of
housing investment decisions in the spirit of Han (2010). In each period households either
upgrade to a larger home, downgrade, or remain in their existing home. This reduced form
model provides a exible way to capture lumpy patterns in housing investment. We estimate
the evolution the exogenous state variables using standard time series and panel econometric
techniques. In the second step, we estimate the structural parameters in household utility. The
estimator proposed by BBL solves a revealed preference problem. We assume that the policy
function estimated for housing investment in the rst stage is the solution to a household's
dynamic programming problem. The estimator reverse engineers a period utility function that
rationalizes the estimated decision rules by solving a system of revealed preference inequalities.
An attractive feature of our estimator is that it allows for non-convex adjustment costs and
credit constraints.
Given our parameter estimates, we use our dynamic model to simulate a typical household's
response to a set of negative shocks meant to mimic the current disruptions in the U.S. housing
3market. The counterfactuals we consider are a housing price bust, a decrease in income, and
a tightening of lending standards. Our results demonstrate that many households do not alter
their housing choice in response to these shocks, but rather adjust nondurable consumption
expenditures. The intuition behind this result is simple- households in the model only move
two to three times before retirement (as do most households in the data). Because they are
eectively locked in by the substantial adjustment costs, changes in housing market conditions
do not inuence their level of housing stock nor housing consumption. Instead, they respond to
the shock by partially reducing home equity, partially by reducing expenditures on nondurable
consumption goods.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the theoretical and empirical literature relevant
for our study in the next section. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the data
and descriptive evidence. In section 5, we provide an overview of the BBL estimation technique.
Section 6 and 7 describe the rst and second stage of estimation. In section 8 we present our
benchmark model simulation results and section 9 conducts sensitivity analysis with respect to
crucial structural parameters. Section 10 concludes; additional details about computation are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Following Mankiw's (1982) aggregate study of consumer durables, a sizeable literature has
developed that uses structural household-level models of housing demand and tenure choice to
study the interaction between house prices, household consumption, and tenure decisions.
The closest paper in spirit to ours is the work by Li and Yao (2007) and Li et al. (2009).
The former paper constructs a life cycle model of housing tenure choice to study the impact
of house price changes on housing choices and consumer welfare for dierent age groups of
the population. The key distinction between their paper and ours is two-fold. First, while
their paper contains a more explicit model of the life cycle and housing tenure choice, they
restrict attention to a preference specication in which the elasticity of substitution between
nondurables and housing services is xed to one (that is, the aggregator is of Cobb-Douglas
form). Our paper, as Li et al. (2009) estimates this crucial parameter and nds the elasticity
to be larger than one. Our model simulations document that this dierence has important
implications for the dynamics of housing and consumption choices. Second, while their main
focus lies on the impact of house price changes on consumption allocations over the life cycle and
the distribution of its welfare impacts across dierent households, we focus more directly on the
impact of house price shocks on housing demand and the demand for nondurable consumption.
4Li et al. (2009) perform a structural estimation of a model very similar to Li and Yao (2007)
using method of moments estimation. The main dierence in our econometric method is that
we use a multi-step estimator adapted from the dynamic games literature. The advantages of
this method compared to brute force approaches are well known. First, there is less risk of
misspecication since the rst stage is estimated in a completely exible manner. Second, it
is easier to include a rich set of state variables since the model does not need to be computed
repeatedly at each point in time. Brute force approaches typically require the researcher to
restrict attention to a subset of the relevant state variables of interest because of computational
costs. Finally, the computations are often more reliable and accurate. In brute force approaches,
numerical error from the inner loop where the model is computed are known to propagate into
the outer loop of the optimization procedure. Resulting estimates and standard errors can be
very sensitive to the error tolerance in the inner loop and there is no numerical theory to guide
these choices. See, for example, Dube, Fox and Su (2009).
Related to our economic model of housing, Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2010), Yao and Zhang (2005), Hintermaier and Koeniger (2009), Kiy-
otaki et al. (2008), Iacoviello and Pavan (2009). and Diaz and Luengo Prado (2008, 2009) use
a similar life cycle model to study the impact of the presence of housing on portfolio choice,
precautionary saving and the wealth distribution. The latter authors also employ their model
to argue that the current user cost approach to measure price changes for housing services in
the consumer price index (CPI) is biased in the presence of owner-occupied housing and house-
hold heterogeneity. In a sequence of quantitative papers Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf
(2009a,b,c) use a life cycle model with tenure choice to explore the impact of tax treatments and
dierent mortgage designs on home ownership rates and explore the reasons for the substantial
increase in this rate in the U.S. in the last decade. Yang (2009) documents the role of down
payment constraints and transaction costs on the life cycle prole of housing and consumption.
Oralo-Magne and Rady (2006) study the interaction of nancial markets conditions and home
ownership rates in a structural model of housing choices. Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006)
and Piazessi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) explore the connection between house and asset prices.
The role as collateral of housing is the main theme of a recent literature that focuses on the
joint housing and mortgage choice. Important examples of this work include Hurst and Staord
(2004), Luengo-Prado (2006), and Chambers et al. (2009a,b). The recent increase in default
on mortgages has motivated a small but growing literature on structural models of foreclosures
within this context. See, for instance, Jeske et al. (2010) and Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009).
The same issue is analyzed empirically, among others, by Carroll and Li (2008).
On the empirical side, an attempt has been made to quantify the wealth eect on nondurable
5consumption from changes in house prices. Leading work in this strand of the literature include
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003), Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2004) and Campbell and Cocco
(2007). They document a sizable housing wealth eect and contrast their results to estimates
of the wealth eects from other nancial assets. We use our model to document how strongly
nondurable consumption responds to a house price decline and study how this negative wealth
eect from house prices interacts with down payment constraints and negative income shocks.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on estimation of dynamic decision problems
with non-convex adjustment costs. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that attempts
to estimate such a structural model, besides Li et al. (2009) cited above is Hall and Rust
(2003). The simulated minimum distance estimator that they propose is not computationally
feasible in our application because it requires repeatedly computing the optimal policy function.
Computing a single optimal policy function in our model takes one week of CPU time with
an advanced workstation. Our estimator avoids the burden of repeatedly computing optimal
policies. Finally, our paper is closely related to Han (2010). Our rst stage is quite similar to
her reduced form model of housing demand. We depart from her work because we estimate a
households structural utility parameters. This allows us to explore counterfactuals that would
not otherwise be possible in a reduced form approach.
3 The Model
We model a typical household's consumption and housing choice as a partial equilibrium,
dynamic decision problem with a nite lifetime horizon. Households live for T periods and
in each period t they choose consumption expenditures on nondurables, ct;and the amount of
one period-risk free nancial assets to bring to the next period, at+1: We let ht denote the
size of the household's real housing stock at the beginning of the period, so that ht+1 is the
amount of housing chosen today for tomorrow. A household derives a service ow g(ht) = ght
from the housing stock where g > 0 is a parameter. In our application, we shall assume that
g = 0:075, which is close to estimates of housing user costs in the literature: Households value

















where  is the standard time discount factor and  measures the degree of altruism to leave
bequests bT at the end of life. Expectations E0 are taken with respect to the stochastic processes
6driving labor income and house prices, which we specify below. Let pt denote the relative price
of one unit of housing, in terms of the numeraire nondurable consumption good. Housing prices
fptgT
t=0 follow rst order stochastic Markov processes.
At time 0; agents are endowed with initial asset holdings (a0;h0) and one unit of time per
period, which they supply inelastically to the labor market to earn labor income yt: The labor
income process is composed of two components, a deterministic mean life cycle prole "t (which
incorporates aggregate income growth in the economy as a result of technological progress) and
a stochastic component t that follows a rst order Markov process. Households retire at an




"tt if t < Tr
b if t  Tr
We model the two main frictions in the housing market explicitly. First, the stock of housing
is subject to nonconvex adjustment costs. Specically, in order to purchase a home of size ht+1
the household has to spend
ptht+1 + pt(ht+1;ht)
where ptht+1 is the purchase price of the home and pt(ht+1;ht) is the transaction cost a
household has to bear when adjusting the owned stock housing from ht to ht+1: We assume
that the function  takes the form
(ht+1;ht) =
(
  (ht+1 + ht) if ht+1 6= ht
0 if ht+1 = ht
where the number  measures the transaction cost. In most of our analysis we shall assume
that  = 0:03:, that is, which is representative of real estate fees.4
A second key friction in our model is the requirement for households to acquire (and main-
tain) some minimal positive equity share in the house. We assume that the joint choice of
nancial assets and housing positions satises the following collateral constraint:
at+1   (1   )ptht+1: (2)
4We do not have direct data on transaction prices. In principle, we could infer them indirectly through
the use of our structural model. However, taking a direct stance on transaction costs will give a more ecient
estimate of the remaining model parameters. As we shall show in our policy simulations, our model is able
to reasonably match key moments of our data, where transaction costs play a large role. Also, the simulation
results suggest that qualitatively, many of our policy conclusions will be robust to a fairly broad range of
transaction costs as long as they are sizeable (and as long as the adjustment cost function has the nonconvex
form we have specied).
7Here  2 [0;1] is the fraction of the purchase price of the house that has to be paid down at
purchase, i.e. (1 ) is the fraction of the purchase price that can be nanced via a mortgage.
In most of our experiments we shall assume that households are able to nance at most 80
percent of their housing purchases through mortgages.5 Also note that as long as  2 [0;1];
households can only borrow against their housing collateral; uncollateralized debt is therefore
ruled out by assumption in our model.
Thus the key frictions in the housing market are summarized by the transaction cost 
parameter and the collateral constraint parameter ; with  =  = 0 denoting frictionless
housing markets. Our simulation exercises will therefore be able to quantify the importance
of frictions in the housing market by deducing optimal choices of households under various
assumptions on (;):
In addition to housing, households can use nancial assets to accumulate wealth. These
assets yield a constant real interest rate r. If households borrow (subject to the collateral
constraints), they face a real mortgage interest rate rm > r: In most of our exercises we
treat interest rates as constant, but we will analyze how the dynamic consumption and asset




r if a  0
rm if a < 0
the budget constraint can be written as
ct + at+1 + ptht+1 + pt(ht+1;ht) = yt + (1 + r(at))at + ptht: (3)
Finally, consumption and housing choices are constrained to be nonnegative:
ct;ht+1  0 (4)
Households maximize (1) subject to the constraints (2);(3) and (4): In the appendix we of-
fer further details on the recursive formulation and computation of this partial equilibrium
household decision problem.
5This is a typical down payment requirement in conforming mortgages oered by Freddie Mac and Fan-
nie Mae. Our sample extends to the 1997 and predates the explosion in subprime mortgages. A 20 percent
downpayment requirement is representative of credit constraints during this time period.
84 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we discuss our data which primarily comes from the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID), a national household level longitudinal survey. We then present descrip-
tive evidence that motivate our modeling choices. Specically, we document lumpy housing
investment and life-cycle patterns of housing tenure decisions.
From the PSID, we select a panel of households between 1980 and 1993, including only
households that own their primary residence. 6 The sample contains 1931 households for a
total of 14,556 household-year observations. The key variables are income, value of primary
residence, annual mortgage payment, home equity, an indicator of whether the household moved
in a given year, and demographic information. We supplement our data with 30 year xed
interest mortgage rates from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.7 We also use the home price
index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which collects home price information from
home sales nanced with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conventional mortgages. Both series
span the years 1975 to 2009. We also impute measures of non-housing wealth and consumption
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX data are not reliable for estimation,
but are nonetheless informative for descriptive purposes.
4.1 Aggregate Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 lists descriptive summary statistics. All dollar values are deated by the non-housing
component of the consumer price index, which serves as our numeraire good. The base year is
1980. Housing is a signicant component of household wealth and expenditures. The average
household occupies a $90,000 home, valued at double its annual income. On average households
have a 2/3 equity stake in their home, which is by far the largest source of household wealth.
Home equity averages $59,000, whereas non-housing wealth reported in the CEX averages
$12,000. Households nance 77%, of their home using a mortgage and carry a positive mortgage
balance. Annual mortgage payments account for 9% of total income on average.
Adjustment costs to moving play a key role in our model. If the costs are high enough,
the model predicts households should move to a dierent home infrequently and make lumpy
adjustments to housing stock. This behavior is evident in the data. Households move in just
4.3% of the years. The size of the adjustments are large, averaging a change of $40,000 in
6We only include households where the head of household is married, between the age of 20 and 65 and born
between 1920 and 1959. We exclude households where the head of household changed during the sample period
and any household that reports an income below $10,000 or above $150,000, a trimming of approximately the
top and bottom 2% of households based on income. We also exclude a small number of households reporting
negative home equity balances.
7Formerly the Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
9Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Num Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Income 14,456 45,783 23,691 10,194 163,183
Home Size 14,456 80,680 64,450 363 725,986
Home Value 14,456 89,869 73,012 436 871,175
Home Equity 14,456 59,543 61,451 39 871,228
Home Value/Income 14,456 2.07 1.54 0.006 42
Home Equity/Home Value 14,456 0.660 0.029 0.0004 1
Annual Mortgage Payment 14,456 4,306 4,568 0 80,293
Consumption* 14,456 18,934 21,117 0 815,342
Non-Housing Wealth* 14,456 12,621 21,553 -38,602 139,379
Move Indicator 11,343 0.0426 0.202 0 1
Upgrade Indicator 11,343 0.0321 0.176 0 1
Downgrade Indicator 14,343 0.0105 0.102 0 1
All dollar values deated by non-housing component of consumer price index: base year
1980. Move indicator variables reported on a truncated sample size that only includes
observations with a non-missing lagged observation.
Home size represents the quantity of housing expressed in 1980 dollars. It is calculated by
dividing real home values by the FHFA home price index. We do not have information on
household locations and thus are not able to account for regional dierences in home prices.
* Imputed from Consumer Expenditure Survey
home size. Households typically upgrade to larger homes; 75% of moves are upgrades, with
an average increase in home size of $24,000. Table 2 lists the frequencies for the number of
moves per household during the 14 year sample period. The majority of households, 58%, never
move, and it is rare for a household to move more than once. Extrapolated over a life-cycle,
households move one or two times after their rst home purchase. Consistent with lumpy
investment behavior, the large standard deviation in the ratio of house value to income (1.54
reported in table 1) in part indicates that households do not continuously adjust housing in
response to income uctuations.
4.2 Life Cycle Patterns
Table 3 reports summary statistics by birth cohort. Several patterns emerge about life cycle
behavior.8 Both income and housing exhibit a hump-shaped pattern. Young households move
into progressively larger homes until they are middle-aged and in the process accumulate home
equity, both in total and as a percentage of home value. But as households approach retirement,
income falls and they downgrade to smaller homes. The frequency of moves declines in age,
from 6.3% for the youngest cohort to 2.7% for the oldest.
8In general, a cohort table cannot distinguish life cycle eects from cohort eects; life cycle interpretation is
only suggestive.









Note: we may be underreporting
the number of moves because of
gaps in the panel.
Table 3: Birth Cohort Sample Means
Birth Cohort 1956-59 1951-55 1946-50 1941-45 1936-40 1931-35 1926-30 1921-25
Num obs 1,244 2,690 2,973 1,907 1,321 1,458 1,851 924
Income 42,372 44,745 47,311 47,718 50,234 47,092 45,332 37,690
Home Size 69,190 78,573 88,106 81,222 80,950 84,702 81,093 71,408
Home Value 79,973 89,159 98,127 90,089 89,294 93,281 89,650 76,518
Home Equity 35,791 45,158 58,139 57,105 64,072 78,239 78,686 68,294
Home Equity/
Home Value
0.435 0.491 0.579 0.654 0.729 0.835 0.862 0.902
With a Non-missing Lagged Observation
Num obs 945 2,209 2,349 1,512 1,032 1,148 1,466 637
Move Frequency 0.063 0.057 0.054 0.046 0.019 0.028 0.022 0.027
Upgrade Frequency 0.056 0.044 0.045 0.033 0.013 0.025 0.014 0.011
Downgrade Frequency 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.016
Conditional on Move
Num obs 60 126 126 69 20 32 32 17
 Home Size 31,976 28,961 37,982 23,802 13,825 -5,682 -7,801 -10,977
All dollar values deated by non-housing component of consumer price index: base
year 1980.
115 Estimation Procedure
We use the two-step method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) for estimating the
structural parameters of our model. The estimation procedure in this paper proceeds in two
steps. In the rst step, the economist exibly estimates the reduced form decision rule and
law of motion for the state variables. In the model in section 3, the exogenous state variables
include income, home prices, and interest rates. Endogenous state variables include the current
stock of housing and savings. The decision rule is the optimal choice of housing and savings
as a function of the current state.
In the second step, the economist nds the structural payo utility parameters which ra-
tionalize the reduced form decision rules. We model period utility with a familiar constant
elasticity of substitution form. During the life cycle households derive utility from housing, h









where  and  are parameters to be estimated. The term,  captures consumption shares, and
the term  captures the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing consump-
tion. The elasticity parameter is particularly important as our counterfactual exercises will
demonstrate in the next section. Other models of housing demand (see Li and Yao (2007))
assume this parameter takes on a value of zero (unit elasticity). We set the utility ow of
housing parameter to  = 0:075. This implies that for every $100,000 dollars of housing stock,
valued in 1980 dollars, the agent receives $7,500 in housing services for a particular year. This
number is consistent with the literature on owners equivalent rent.
In our model, households maximize lifetime expected discounted utility given time t in-
formation. In order to simplify our problem, we assume that households live until age 70.







In the above, q70 is the amount of home equity at age 70. Our model allows for a bequest
motive where households value leaving housing equity to its heirs. The parameter  describes
a household's preference to leave a bequest. A bequest motive is necessary to understand
observed choices since otherwise agents would have a strong incentive to liquidate all housing
at t = 70.
126 First Stage: Reduced Form Policy Functions
The rst step of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) requires us to estimate an agent's reduced
form decision rule. The in model of section 2, the choice variables of the agent are next period's
housing stock ht+1; non-housing consumption ct and borrowing/savings at. Our dynamic pro-
gramming model implies that these decisions should be a function of an agent's state variables.
We begin by describing our estimation of ht+1.
In the presence of transactions cost to moving, households move infrequently and, when
they do, make lumpy adjustments to their stock of housing. We model this as a mixed
discrete/continuous choice problem. The method of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) requires
that we exibly approximate the agent's decision rules so that we let the "data speak" and
allow us to empirically recover the decision rules the agents are using. Ideally, one would use
non-parametric methods for inference. However, as a practical matter, nonparametric rules
do not work well when there are more than 2 or 3 conditioning variables or the number of
observations is moderate in size as will be the case in our application. As is well known,
the curse of dimensionality in these methods generate very poorly estimated models. In our
application, we instead use specications that are parametric, but allow for exibility through
the inclusion of splines and higher order terms when the data is suciently rich.
We use a multinomial logit model. The probability of household i making a moving choice
of j at time t is given by







The theoretical model of the last section implies that an agent's policy function in the dynamic
program should depend on the state variables. In the above, we label the state variables as
sit. These include variables such as prices, current income, liabilities and housing stock. Since
income follows a life cycle process, we will also want to keep track of individual specic state
variables such as age.
We expect households that experience an increase in income to be more likely to upgrade and
less likely to downgrade. Households occupying small homes might be more likely to upgrade
and less likely to downgrade. To capture the impact of a down payment constraint, we include
a linear spline in the home equity ratio. Specically, we allow the eect of the home equity
ratio to dier for equity ratios above and below 15%. If down payment constraints have an
important eect on housing decisions we would expect the likelihood of moving|in particular,
upgrading|to reduce signicantly as equity falls through the lower range. We would expect
the equity ratio to have much less eect in the higher home equity range. We apply the user
13cost method to measure the price of home ownership. We use a simple measure: the dierence
in real interest rates and the expected real rate of home price ination. This measure captures
both the nancing costs of mortgage interest payments and the osetting investment component
of housing capital gains. In our application, we assume households have rational expectations
and thus measure expected home price ination using the realized value of contemporaneous
home price ination. We also condition on age and age-squared since our model suggests that
life cycle considerations should inuence housing choices.
We use a parsimonious specication to capture the lumpiness in housing stock adjustments.
We model the size of housing stock adjustments as a simple average of log changes in home
size:9
jlog(hit+1)   log(hit)j = 0 + it (6)
Under the assumption that the  error term and u error term in the multinomial logit
model are uncorrelated, we can estimate the adjustment size separately using the subset of
households that either upgrade or downgrade. We have also experimented with more elaborate
specication. However, the number of adjustments in our data is a small fraction of the overall
observations. Also, in our second step estimates, we will need to forecast individual level
housing decisions. The time series literature on forecasting tells us that over-parameterized
models typically generate poorer forecasts that more parsimonious specications. Therefore,
we opt for this simple specication.10
6.1 Reduced Form Policy Function Results
Table 4 reports results for the multinomial logit model. The coecients on the decision to
remain in the current home are normalized to zero. Almost all of the coecient signs are as
expected. Households in larger homes are more likely to downgrade and less likely to upgrade.
As income increases, they are more likely to upgrade and less likely to downgrade. As the
price of housing increases, measured by the user cost, households are less likely to upgrade.
User cost has an insignicant eect on downgrades. We nd down payment constraints are
quite important. In the low equity range, below 15%, a drop in equity lowers the probability
9We also tested methods that distinguished upward and downward adjustment sizes and parameterized ad-
justment size through factors such as income and home size. We found that such models performed poorly when
simulations veered outside the support of the distribution of the variables. Moreover, with so few observations
of upgrades and downgrades there is a large loss in degrees of freedom from estimating separate adjustment
sizes.
10We also experimented with an (S,s) inventory model of durable good expenditures as in Attanasio (2000).
This model imposes more structure than a exible multinomial logit. With so few adjustments, the (S,s) model
did not yield reasonable results.
14Table 4: Upgrade/Downgrade Multinomial Logit
Downgrades Upgrades




Low Home Equity Ratio (< :15) 6.5557 13.3245
(7.2891) (4.9580)
High Home Equity Ratio (> :15) -0.8571 -0.2155
(0.4175) (0.2279)








Num Moves 119 364
Num Obs 11343 11343
Magnitude of Adjustment Size in Logs
Num Obs Mean Std. Dev.
483 0.496 0.486
All dollar values deated by non-housing component of consumer price index:
base year 1980. There is a linear spline in the home equity to house value ratio
term with a knot value at 0.15. The reported coecients are the marginal eects
in each region. Standard errors in parentheses. Magnitude of adjustment size
measured as jlog(hit)   log(hit 1)j for households that move. Sample restricted
to observations with non-missing lagged observations.
of upgrading. The magnitude is very large. Households also less likely to downgrade as equity
falls, which makes sense since, even after a downgrade, such households may have diculty
securing a new mortgage. In the high equity range, home equity has no signicant eect on
upgrades, but extra equity makes it less likely for a household to downgrade. Finally, older
households are less likely to make any sort of adjustment.
6.2 Mortgages and Savings
We do not have reliable data on household savings, mortgage choices, and bequests and cannot
estimate these decisions from data. We have attempted to make imputations from other data
sources, including the CEX, but have found these imputations to be too imprecise and this
measurement error appeared to bias our estimates. Instead we make the following parsimonious
15modeling assumptions based on what we know about the mortgage and savings decisions of the
typical U.S. household during this time period. We assume that households used mortgage
products that were common during the 1980's and early 1990's.
We assume households nance their homes with 30 year xed rate mortgages. A household
that moves transfers home equity from its prior residence into the new home. The remaining
value of the home is nanced with a new 30 year xed rate mortgage set at the prevailing
interest rate.11 We also assume housing is only the source of wealth. We abstract from other
forms of borrowing or lending. We note that our data from the CEX shows non-housing wealth
is insignicant portion of households' total assets.
In some instances, particularly near the end of the life cycle, a household could have excess
home equity. This happens for downgrades to homes valued less than the current amount
of home equity. We lock this excess wealth into an annuity with an amortization term that
expires at end of the life cycle. Thus, the annuity is completely drained at the end of life cycle.
Periodic payments supplement income. Consumption is simply the dierence between income
and mortgage payments. If a household pays o its mortgage in full, it consumes its entire
income. Households do not prepay or renance mortgages, nor can they borrow against their
home equity. These assumptions restrict a household's ability to draw down home equity to
smooth consumption and to save beyond the value of a home in anticipation of a bequest.
We do not directly impose a down payment constraint in our estimation. Instead, we let
down payment constraints enter through the equity ratio term in the multinomial logit model
of moving decisions. Finally, it is necessary to impose a subsistence requirement. In rare
instances simulated consumption would be negative. We endow those households with $1,000
in consumption. Likewise, if home equity is negative at the end of the life cycle, we endow those
households with $1,000 in equity for a bequest. Both of these assumptions can be interpreted
as an insurance policy against particularly poor shocks.
We must make these assumptions because we do not have reliable data on mortgage -
nancing and savings. Nonetheless, we feel they are reasonable, and we show that our forward
simulations match key moments from the life cycle quite closely.
6.3 Exogenous State Variables: Income, Home Prices and Interest
Rates
In the method of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), the econometrician must also estimate
the stochastic processes governing the law of motion for the state variables. The process for
11The term is 30 years regardless of age. It may be reasonable to assume older households choose shorter
terms, but we do not have data that would allow us to predict term lengths.

















Random Eects with AR(1) error term dis-
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de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household's birth year. Standard errors in
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income includes an age component, a cohort eect, household random eects, and an AR(1)
error disturbance:
log(yit) = 0 + 1ageit + 2age
2
it + 3birthcohorti + i + itzit










Estimates are reported in table 5 which shows that income is persistent and exhibits a
hump-shaped pattern over the life-cycle.
We model the time series process for real interest rates rt and real home price ination t
as a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) with one lag,
rt = cr + rrrt 1 + rt 1 + ert
t = c + t 1 + rrt 1 + et (8)
17Table 6: Interest Rate and Home Ination VAR
interest rate home ination
rt 1 0.615 t 1 0.534
(0.105) (0.147)
t 1 -0.435 rt 1 0.113
(0.086) (0.178)





Num Yrs 33 1975-2009
Standard errors in parentheses.
where the error term is distributed bivariate normal, e  N(0;). We use a longer time series
that spans the years 1975 to 2009. Results are presented in table 6. Notice the coecient on
the home ination constant; average real home price ination was just slightly greater than
zero over this time period.
6.4 Goodness of Fit
Using our estimated decision rule and law of motion, it is possible to simulate the entire life
cycle of housing decisions for an agent in our model. This simulation is a key input into the
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) estimator. We use two methods to evaluate the goodness
of the t of our simulations. First, we examine the entire, 40 year, simulated life cycles for the
youngest cohort of households aged 30 to 34. Second, we consider the rst ve years of forward
simulation for all cohorts. In both exercises, we average several key variables across households
and simulation paths for ve year intervals.
Table 7 reports the full life cycle simulation for the youngest cohort. As a rst check,
compare the cohorts' initial conditions in the data column to its rst ve years of simulations
in the \ages 30-34" column. The t is sensible. Beyond the rst ve years, the simulated life
cycles show a distinct hump shaped pattern in income and consumption. There is also a hump
shaped pattern in home size; in early years households upgrade rapidly, then there is a leveling
o mid-life, and a slight drop at the tail end of the life cycle. This pattern is largely driven by
upgrading and downgrading frequencies. In early years, there is a high rate of upgrades which
gradually declines to a low level by the end of the life cycle. Downgrading frequencies are very
low and constant up until age 55 at which point they start increasing. A comparison with
birth cohort statistics (see table 3) shows that move frequencies match the data quite closely.
18Table 7: Forward Simulation for Youngest Cohort
Years forward 0 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 30-35 36-40
Age data
30-34
30-39 35-44 40-49 45-54 50-59 55-64 60-69 65-74
Income 42,372 47,648 55,403 61,975 65,717 66,356 63,457 57,642 54,586
Home Size 69,190 74,992 85,781 95,294 102,767 107,454 109,421 108,678 107,477
House Value 79,973 89,650 111,681 136,486 161,189 184,227 206,344 225,041 231,180
Home Equity 35,791 37,579 47,063 62,420 82,252 106,761 136,716 168,169 179,835
Home Equity/
Home Value
0.435 0.415 0.443 0.494 0.558 0.634 0.721 0.802 0.827
Move Frequency 0.063 0.071 0.063 0.050 0.041 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.034
Upgrade Frequency 0.056 0.060 0.053 0.040 0.030 0.023 0.017 0.012 0.009
Downgrade Frequency 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.025
Consumption 43,876 50,608 56,305 59,361 59,588 56,694 51,591 49,118
Non Housing Wealth 308 685 940 1,179 1,644 2,335 3,162 3,359
All dollar values deated by non-housing component of consumer price index: base year 1980.
Italicized entries correspond to the 1956-1959 cohort average in the data. They are aged between 30
and 34. Regular font entries correspond to forward simulations averaged across each 5 year interval.
Although the dollar-valued magnitudes cannot be directly compared, notice that for income
and home size the peaks in the hump exactly match the age of the hump in the data. That is,
in mid-life (ages 50-54) income peaks, and with a lag (ages 55-59) home size peaks. We also
see a steady growth in house values over the life cycle which is partly due to upgrades, and
also real home price ination. In addition, home equity grows as households pay o mortgages
and experience home price capital gains. As in the data, we capture an increase in the home
equity ratio (home equity/home value) over the life cycle. As a minor point, we include an
entry for non-house wealth. This is the size of the annuity from left over home equity for those
households that downgrade to homes worth less than their home equity. The magnitude is
small, on the order of at most 2% of home equity wealth, and thus the assumptions about
non-house savings behavior should have a negligible eect on our nal results.
Table 8 reports statistics for each cohort, not just the youngest. Under each cohort heading,
the rst column reports the statistics from the data, and the second, statistics from ve years
of forward simulation. Again, the simulations are reasonable. The rst ve years of simulation
are close to the initial conditions and the trajectories of the variables match the hump-shaped
patterns that we expect. Young households grow income, housing stocks, and wealth, while
older households experience declines. Moving frequencies match quite closely.
19Table 8: 5-year Forward Simulation: Birth Cohort
Birth Cohort 1956-59 1951-55 1946-50 1941-45
Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim
Income 42,372 47,768 44,745 49,591 47,718 51,420 50,234 50,693
Home Size 69,190 75,097 78,573 83,940 88,106 92,263 81,222 83,857
House Value 79,973 89,611 89,159 99,424 98,127 106,775 90,089 96,701
Home Equity 35,791 37,481 45,158 48,898 58,139 61,934 57,105 60,562
Home Equity
Home Value
0.435 0.417 0.491 0.496 0.579 0.581 0.654 0.656
Move Frequency 0.063 0.073 0.057 0.063 0.054 0.048 0.046 0.039
Upgrade Frequency 0.056 0.061 0.044 0.052 0.045 0.039 0.033 0.030
Downgrade Frequency 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.009
Consumption 43,962 45,630 47,832 47,797
Non Housing Wealth 315 261 273 317
Birth Cohort 1936-40 1931-35 1926-30 1921-25
Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim Data +5yr Sim
Income 50,234 52,126 47,092 47,476 45,332 44,514 37,690 36,611
Home Size 80,950 83,060 84,702 86,032 81,093 81,525 71,408 71,399
House Value 89,294 95,397 93,281 98,270 89,650 93,562 76,518 79,982
Home Equity 64,072 67,345 78,239 81,088 78,686 81,120 68,294 70,914
Home Equity&
Home Value
0.729 0.729 0.835 0.831 0.0862 0.861 0.902 0.901
Move Frequency 0.019 0.032 0.028 0.026 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.023
Upgrade Frequency 0.013 0.023 0.025 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010
Downgrade Frequency 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.013
Consumption 49,833 46,129 43,647 35,978
Non Housing Wealth 303 539 826 711
All dollar values deated by non-housing component of consumer price index: base year 1980.
\Data" columns represent cohort averages in the data. \+5yr Sim" columns correspond to forward
simulations averaged across a 5 year interval. Data columns are blank for consumption and Non
Housing Wealth because we do not have data on these variables.
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7.1 Estimation Details
In this section, we describe the second stage of the estimation procedure that estimates the
structural utility function parameters. The method we use to estimate these parameters follows
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). For the sake of brevity, we do not explain the entire
estimation procedure in this paper, the interested reader is referred to the original paper. In the
second stage, the econometrician rst simulates life cycle housing and non-durable consumption
under the policy function that we estimated in the rst stage. Next, he reverse engineers
the preference parameters which make this observed policy "optimal" in the sense that no
alternative policies yield higher utility.
There are three types of alternative policy functions in our estimator. The rst type draws
uniform random perturbations of the multinomial logit model parameters. For the second
type, we manually generate variation in moving frequencies and housing shares. Specically,
households move every Nth year, where, for dierent alternatives, N varies between 3 and 10.
In a moving year, households move to a house of size H, which varies across alternatives in a
range between 88% and 112% of a household's initial housing to income ratio. This variation
helps to identify housing shares, which depend on both the consumption share  and elasticity
 parameters. The variation in moving frequencies helps to separately identify the elasticity of
substitution. Intuitively, the elasticity determines the length of time that a household would
tolerate living in a home that is not optimal. For the third type, we allow households to either
deplete or add to home equity in the last ve years of the life cycle. In each of those ve years,
they either convert up to 10% of home equity into consumption or add up to 10% to home
equity by reducing consumption. Under the optimal policy they neither add to nor reduce home
equity. These alternatives generate variation to identify the retirement/bequest parameter.
7.2 Second Stage Results
We estimate the model on a sub-sample of 450 households. We simulate 55 life cycle paths per
household. We use 22 alternative policies with 30% manually generating moving frequency and
housing share variation, 70% perturbing policy functions coecients, and, on top of that, 30%
varying end of life home equity. Despite the computational advantages of the method, this is
the largest sample that our workstation can accommodate. We use a subsampling procedure
to calculate standards. In particular, we estimate the parameters on 100 separate subsamples
21Table 9: Utility Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate
Consumption Share  0.7653
(0.0188)




of the same size.12
The results are presented in Table 9. Notice the elasticity of substitution parameter is
signicantly greater than zero.
As a validation of the results, it is useful to take the estimated parameter results and
calculate implied housing shares in a static model of housing demand.13 The implied housing
share of income is 17.31%, which compares quite favorably to the 14.3% share in the raw data.
8 Simulation Results from the Structural Model
8.1 Parameterization
In the interest of clarity we summarize the parameters used for the simulations of the structural
model in Table 10. Whenever possible and applicable we use the parameters estimated and
employed in the previous sections.
We now use these parameters to simulate the response of consumption and asset accumu-
lation choices to income and house price shocks. We proceed in three steps. First, in order
to briey explain the main mechanisms of the structural model, we display the life cycle pro-
les in the absence of shocks. Then we subject households to joint income and house price
shocks, under the benchmark parameterization. Finally we assess the importance of the size
of nancial constraints, interest rates, and the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and housing services in the utility function for household responses to these shocks. The rst
two sensitivity analyses are motivated by the recent nancial and macroeconomic crisis that
has led to changes in the extent to which households can borrow against the value of their
home and the mortgage interest rates they are able to obtain. The third exercise highlights
that precise estimates of structural utility parameters are quantitatively important in assessing
12This procedure does not account for rst stage error in the construction of standard errors.
13In the static model, households maximize the period utility function subject to a budget constraint on
housing rental and consumption spending. It is assumed that the housing rental rate is 7.5% of a home's value.
22Table 10: Parameterization of Structural Model
Parameter Value Interpretation
Preferences
 0:97 Time Discount Factor
 2:56 Degree of Altruism
 1 Intertemporal Elasticity of Subst.
g 7:5% Service Flow from Housing Stock
 0:77 Consumption Share in Utility Function
 0:2435 Elasticity of Sub. between c;h: 1
1 
Housing and Financial Markets
 3% Transaction Cost
 20% Downpayment Requirement
r 1% Return on Financial Assets
rm 7:24% Mortgage Interest Rate
p 0:95 Persistence of House Price Shock
p 0:03 Std. Dev of House Price Shock
Labor Income Process
 0:95 Persistence of Income Shock
 0:3 Std. Dev. of Income Shock
"t =  "t(1 + g)t g = 1:9%
f "tg: Hansen (1991) Life Cycle Labor Income Prole
b 0:5 Pension
23the model-implied consumption and wealth response to income and house price shocks.
8.2 The Mechanics of the Model
Figure 1 displays life cycle proles of income shocks14, t, and house prices, pt, (the exogenous
stochastic driving forces of the model), consumption of the composite good, ct; nancial assets,
at+1; real housing assets, ht+1, and a variable we call voluntary equity, qt+1 = at+1+(1 )ptht+1:
As explained in the appendix, it is helpful computationally to use this variable instead of
nancial wealth in the recursive formulation of the household problem. However, introducing
this variable is not only useful for computation, but also helps to interpret the simulation results.
Note from the nancing constraint (2) it follows that qt+1  0; and qt+1 = 0 if the constraint
binds. The variable qt+1 measures the equity stake in housing, in excess of the fraction, 1   ;
as required by the nancing constraint. Thus qt+1 = 0 indicates that in period t households are
nancing-constrained whereas qt+1 > 0 indicates a non-binding constraint. For the gure (as
for all simulations to follow) households start with zero nancial and minimal housing assets.15
Underlying the life cycle paths are the decision rules in the presence of income and house price
risk, but for this benchmark simulations the realizations of the income and house prices are
constant sequences.16
From the gure one can clearly see the key housing market frictions in action. Due to the
nonconvex adjustment cost, households alter the size of their houses infrequently: they move
three times during the rst 15 years of their lives, reaching their desired housing size at age 35
and then, absent further shocks to house prices and incomes, stay put. The fact that households
move several times prior to reaching their unconstrained optimal size of the house is due to the
presence of the nancing constraint. As can be seen from the time path of voluntary equity,
after the rst move the household's nancing constraint is binding and voluntary equity is zero,
qt = 0: After three periods households start to accumulate equity in excess of what is required
from the nancing constraint, and another move is triggered. As with the rst move, the second
house the household purchases is still suboptimally small: after the purchase, voluntary equity
is again zero and the nancing constraint is binding once again. The households accumulate
voluntary equity again until the last upward adjustment in the housing stock occurs once more.
14Recall that total labor income is given by yt = t"t: Thus what we plot here is income net of the deterministic
life cycle component which yields proles that are easier to interpret.
15We cannot start households o with zero housing since housing purchased today only generates services
tomorrow and the utility function is not well-dened at h = 0: Instead we let h0 = hmin; where hmin is the
smallest point on the housing grid.
16Qualitatively it makes no dierence for the dynamics of consumption and housing choices whether the
constant prices and incomes are equal to the low or the high realization of the corresponding Markov chains
although quantitatively low house prices and high incomes generate slightly larger and more rapid adjustments
in the housing stock position.
24Figure 1: Life Cycle Proles in Absence of Shocks
This last adjustment is \unconstrained" in the sense that the nancing constraint is not
binding at this move: the household could have aorded a larger home but nds it suboptimal
to choose such a larger housing position. In contrast to previous moves, the equity stake exceeds
the required minimum share as qt falls following the move but remains positive.
Absent the nancing constraint (but in the presence of the nonconvex adjustment cost)
households would have moved only once, catapulting them to the optimal size of the house
right away. Thus in order to reproduce the stylized fact documented above that households
adjust the size of their home infrequently, but more than once on average over their lifetime,
the combination of both frictions in the housing market is crucial. Quantitatively the model
reproduces the average time in between housing adjustments and the number of moves during
a households' lifetime documented above for US data rather well, at least for the early part of
the life cycle.17
Having discussed how households behave in the absence of income and house price shocks we
are now prepared to explain how these households, within the model, respond to simultaneous
declines in income and house prices as observed recently for the US economy.
17To the extent that the model abstracts from housing transactions triggered by relocation shocks we would
expect the model to understate the frequency with which households move. This is apparent for households
in the later stages in their life cycle for which the model, absent income and house price shocks, predicts no
housing size adjustments at all.
25Figure 2: Life Cycle Proles with Negative Income Shocks
8.3 Simulating an Income and House Price Shock
The exercise we carry out is intended to mimic a sudden, unlikely, but not entirely inconceivable
(from the households' perspective) decline in the price of housing. At the same time the
household receives a negative income shock (which by construction is highly, but not perfectly
persistent).18 Given the stylized nature of our structural model, which is necessitated by our
desire to estimate it and provide a tight link between theory and estimation, we view our precise
quantitative results as less important relative to exhibiting to what extent model elements and
parameters (e.g. adjustment costs, the size of the down payment constraint) aect household
responses.
In gure 2 we display the life cycle patterns of consumption, housing, and nancial wealth
prior to and following a negative income shock. We add a concurrent negative house price shock
in gure 3. The income (and house price) shock are assumed to hit early in a household's life,
prior to age 35 when the household, in the absence of shocks, would have acquired its optimal
housing size (see gure 1).
The key observations we make from both gures is that
18Of course, since we use the decision rule of households derived under the Markov process for income and
prices, households at any period understand that the state of the Markov process can switch with certain
probabilty. We simply trace out the dynamic response of households to a particular realization of the stochastic
process.
26Figure 3: Life Cycle Proles with Negative Income Shocks and Negative Home Price Shock
 In response to a negative income shock, households adjust nondurable consumption but
do not down size their homes. When the negative income shock hits, households are
in the process of moving up the housing ladder and nd it suboptimal to (temporarily)
downsize.
 The income shock does aect the life cycle prole of housing and nondurable consumption
signicantly. Relative to the benchmark scenario where households reach their desired
stock of housing at age 34, a persistent fall in income delays movements up the housing
ladder by a good 16 years (note that this assumes that income falls permanently).19
 While the optimal level and general life cycle prole of housing position is not aected
by the fall in housing prices, the timing of the housing adjustments following the shocks
is. Specically, because houses are cheaper now households adjust to their optimal level
more quickly, by about 5 years. This suggests the substitution eect dominates the wealth
eect of a home price decline.
 The age/equity position at the time when the shock happens is important in determining
the household consumption and saving response. If we subject a middle aged household
(of age 35 or older) with a large home equity stake to the same shock, this household
19Of course, given that income and house prices are driven by mean-reverting Markov chains, households
perceive a positive probability that prices and income will eventually recover.
27nds it optimal to keep its entire life cycle prole of housing unaltered and absorb the
entire shock by adjusting nondurable consumption and voluntary equity. A household
of this age has accumulated suciently many assets (relative to the loss in income over
the remaining working life) to keep nondurable consumption reasonably smooth despite
the unfavorable income realizations. This result conrms our rst stage empirical results
showing that age and housing equity are important determinants of housing choices.
 As our results without nonconvex adjustment costs below indicate, the sluggish adjust-
ment of the housing position to shocks crucially depends on the imposition of sizeable
transaction costs for adjusting the size of houses.
9 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to three parameters. The rst set
of comparative statics results is motivated by recent policy relevant changes in the US mortgage
market. In particular we want to deduce the impact, within our model, of a tightening of credit
lines, as observed in the current crisis of the US mortgage market.
Second we demonstrate that the model with nonconvex adjustment costs on housing gives
fundamentally dierent predictions about household responses to income and house price
changes than the frictionless benchmark model of consumer durables (as put forward by Mankiw
(1982)) in which the adjustment of the stock of housing is completely costless.
Finally, we have spent considerable eort in precisely estimating the preference parameters
of our model, in particular the elasticity of substitution between nondurable consumption and
housing services in the utility function. We therefore want to investigate to what extent the
results of our model depend on this parameter. To this extent we repeat our simulations with
a Cobb-Douglas utility specication which is commonly employed in macroeconomics (see e.g.
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010) or the discussion in Jeske (2005)).
9.1 Relaxing the Financing Constraint
Our model is rich enough to address the question, albeit in stylized form, of what happens
to household's housing and nondurable consumption decisions as the nancial sector tightens
credit lines for mortgages. We now draw out the household response to a simultaneous decline
of income and house prices under the assumption that households are required to hold only a
 = 10% equity share of the value of their home as opposed to  = 20% as modeled so far. One
can interpret our benchmark scenario with tightened credit as the situation after the crisis hit,
28Figure 4: Life Cycle Proles with Relaxed Borrowing Constraints
and the relaxed constraint scenario as the situation prior to the current nancial crisis.
Comparing gure 4 to our benchmark results in gure 1 we observe that the main conse-
quence of a relaxed downpayment constraint is that households purchase larger homes early in
life, and tend to move less frequently. This nding is due to the fact that a relaxed constraint
allows households to more quickly trade up in the housing ladder since they can nance more
of the purchase price of the house at young ages where they are severely constrained by the
collateral constraint. The response to income and price shocks does not depend strongly on
the value of ; since at the time adjustment after the shock is optimal the nancing constraint
was not binding anymore even with the tighter nancing constraint  = 20%; see gure 3.
9.2 The Role of Adjustment Costs
The second key friction in the housing market that we model, besides the downpayment con-
straint, is the presence of sizable transaction costs that need to be borne if (and only if)
households change the size of their home. The benchmark model of consumer durables in
macroeconomics abstracts from xed adjustment costs in the market for consumer durables
(see e.g. Mankiw (1982)). Our model nests this specication; by setting the adjustment cost
parameter to  = 0, we obtain the frictionless model.20 In gure 5 we show, in the absence
20Mankiw's model of a representative consumer did not explicitly include downpayment constraints nor did
it calibrate the household income process to micro data.
29Figure 5: Life Cycle Proles in Absence of Adjustment Costs: No Shocks
of income shocks, that this model delivers fundamentally dierent predictions for the life cycle
proles of consumption, housing, and nancial assets.
Without adjustment costs the model loses its implications derived from lumpy housing
investment decision rules. Now the build-up of consumer durables in the early stages of a
household's live proceeds more gradually.21 Note that consumption increases over time since,
as long as the household is in debt, the relevant interest rate households face is the mortgage
interest rate rm and (1 + rm) > 1.
The model without nonconvex adjustment costs also diers substantially from our bench-
mark in the way households respond to income and house price shocks. See gure 6. Now
the stock of housing reacts immediately and signicantly to the persistent income decline.
Nondurable consumption responds as well.22
9.3 The Role of the Elasticity of Substitution
Finally we show that the dynamic consumption and asset choices crucially depend on the
key preference parameters which we estimated in previous sections. We now document that
21We solve this version of the model with the same discrete state space dynamic programming techniques as
the benchmark in order to allow for the results to be as comparable as possible.
22Note that the nancing constraint remains present in this version of the model. When the shock hits this
constraint is binding and thus a decline in the real value of houses leads to a decline in the value of collateral.
Households can borrow less, and consumption of nondurables falls signicantly.
30Figure 6: Life Cycle Proles in Absence of Adjustment Costs: Shocks
the optimal choices of households depend on how substitutable nondurable consumption and
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The elasticity of substitution between nondurable consumption and housing services is given by
 = 1
1  and was estimated as  = 1
1 0:2435 = 1:32: Rather than going to the extremes of perfect
or no substitutability (both of which are highly implausible given our empirical point estimate
and the small standard errors around these estimates) we document how our result changes
if one adopts the familiar Cobb-Douglas specication23 with unit elasticity of substitution;
that is  = 0 and thus  = 1. Conditional on our choice of a unit intertemporal elasticity
of substitution  = 1 this case has the additional appeal that the utility function becomes
separable in nondurable consumption and housing services. That is
u(c;d) = log(c) + (1   )log(d):
Figure 7 shows that, while qualitatively, the life cycle pattern of consumption and housing
response are similar to that in the benchmark case, timing diers. Households adjust their
housing stock towards the optimal level more quickly (but to about the same extent) with the
23This parameterization was, among others, adopted by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002)
31Figure 7: Life Cycle Proles with Unit Elasticity of Substitution
lower unit elasticity of substitution. Intuitively, the lower the elasticity of substitution, the
more costly it is to sustain a suboptimally low housing/nondurables ratio, and thus the more
quickly households choose to move up the housing size ladder.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed and estimated a dynamic structural model of consumption
and housing demand with a frictional housing market. We use our estimated model to simulate
counterfactual household responses to a set of negative shocks to income, housing prices, and
credit constraints that mimic the current calamity in US housing markets. In our model, we
include two key frictions: down payment constraints and non-convex costs to adjust housing
stocks. Using household level data from the PSID, we estimate the primitives of the model using
the Bajari Benkard Levin (2007) method that is well-suited for estimating such a complicated
dynamic model.
Because of the two frictions, nonconvex adjustment costs and nancing constraints, house-
holds nd it optimal to make infrequent housing stocks adjustments. For the benchmark
parameterization, households move three times before age 35 as they climb the housing lad-
der, before reaching their optimal housing size. Negative income shocks at a young age slow
down this accumulation process, but do not induce a downgrade to a smaller home. Adding
32a negative home price shock to the negative income shock causes households to move up the
housing ladder more quickly because housing is cheaper. As such, any negative eect on home
equity wealth is dominated by a substitution eect. The age at which the shocks hit is impor-
tant. For older households, having already reached the optimal home size, the negative shocks
are absorbed by a reduction in nondurable consumption and home equity. The shocks do not
induce a change in housing stock.
We also document the importance of nancing constraints, adjustment costs, and the pre-
cision of our utility function parameter estimates. All three have signicant eects on the
frequency of housing stock adjustments and the lumpiness of housing investments. At the
center of this adjustment behavior is the ability of households to use home equity to smooth
temporary shocks. Future research has to uncover whether introducing further frictions into
the housing nance decision that make home equity lines of credit and reverse mortgages less
attractive are able to overturn these results.
With regards to a housing market induced recession, our model results suggest there will not
be a sudden direct impact on the housing market because adjustments occur with such rarity,
and household consumption will be minimally aected by the housing bust because they can
use home equity to absorb the shock. Over an extended period of time, the fall in home prices
has a mixed eect on housing and consumption allocations. Young households, climbing the
housing ladder, benet from lower home prices in that they can climb the housing ladder more
quickly, but older households, already owning their optimal sized home, experience a drop in
wealth. To more fully assess the housing market details of this recession, it would be interesting
examine foreclosure decisions, subprime mortgage products, and the response of households at
or near the borrowing constraint. We defer this to future work.
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3611 Computational Appendix
11.1 Recursive Formulation of the Problem
The model in recursive formulation can be written as24
V (;a;h;p;t) = max















0;h) = "t + (1 + r)a + ph
11.2 Transformation of the State Space
One problem of the formulation of the problem above is that the constraint set for (a0;h0) is
not rectangular, and that the constraint on h0 depends on a0; which is itself a choice variable.
This problem can be overcome by dening a new variable, voluntary equity, q0; as
q
0 = a
0 + (1   )ph
0
(see Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008, 2009)). Note that this denition implies that
q = a + (1   )p 1h
where p 1 is the price of housing in the previous period, which now becomes an additional state
variable.. The recursive problem of the household with this transformation of variables now
reads as
v(;q;h;p 1;p;t) = max













0;h) = "t + (1 + r(q;h;p 1))q + [(1   )p   (1 + r(q;h;p 1))(1   )p 1]h
24This is the recursive problem, conditional on not having retired yet. The problem for retired households is
similar and hence omiteed.
37that is, we traded o an additional state variable p 1 against now having a rectangular con-
straint set for the choice variables (c;q0;h0): This is the recursive formulation of the model
we compute. Clearly the consistency condition p0
 1 = p has to hold, that is, tomorrow's past
housing price p0
 1has to equal today's price. The interest rate function now reads as
r(q;h;p 1) =
(
r if q   (1   )p 1h  0
rm if q   (1   )p 1h < 0
Since we use an adjustment cost that is nonconvex, the household decision problem is not
a convex programming problem and numerical approaches that require dierentiability of the
value function cannot be applied. Therefore we use discrete state space dynamic programming
techniques to solve the problem. In particular, we discretize the state space for (q;h) into a
nite rectangular grid (the income and house price process process is already a nite state
Markov chain by assumption) and maximize the objective function by searching, for each (q;h)
over the nite grid of admissible choices (q0;h0): The consumption choice is implied by the
budget constraint.
Given a terminal value function (given by the bequest function) we can iterate backward in
age of the household t to solve for the age-dependent optimal policy and value functions. Once
we have computed these, simulated life cycle patterns of consumption, housing and nancial
wealth can be generated for any sequence of house price and income shock realizations.
12 Appendix: Computation Details; Estimation
In this appendix we describe the computational details related to forward simulating under
the optimal and alternative policy functions, constructing alternative policy functions, and
estimating the second stage. We only describe the computational mechanics in the appendix.
The body of the text outlines the computation methods and discusses the assumptions and
reasons behind our estimation choices. For the estimation of expected discounted utility under
the optimal policy function and under each alternative we forward simulate 55 entire life cycles
per household in the sample. We see the last year of the life cycle T to age 70.
12.1 Exogenous State Variables
Income Process We estimate the income process using a random eects model with an AR(1)
error term. See equation (7). For each household-year observation used in the simulation,
38we rst t a household xed eect i as:
i = log(yit)  
 




We do not t the xed eect using all years for which we observe the household, only for
the particular year. That is, for a given household i, the tted xed eect i could dier
for observations corresponding to dierent years t and t0. The initial income in year 1
of the simulation is set to the income in the data. The lagged error term in year one is
zi1 = 0. Thus according to equation (7) the second year error term is zi2 = i2.
VAR: home prices and interest rates We set the initial conditions in year 1 to the values
in the data corresponding to the observation year. We simulate forward according the
VAR process in equation (8).
12.2 Optimal Policy Function Forward Simulations
Initial Conditions In year 1, we set the variables (housevalue, homesize, remaining mortgage
principal) to their values in the data. In year 1, all households nance their remaining
mortgage principal with a new 30 year xed rate mortgage xed at the year 1 interest
rate. Households that have a zero balance on their remaining mortgage principal do not
have a mortgage. Note again, all dollar valued variables are in real terms, deated by
the non-housing component of the CPI, and mortgage interests rates are xed at the real
interest rate, not a nominal interest rate. Home equity in year 1 is calculated as the
dierence between the housevalue and the remaining mortgage principal. Non-housing
nancial assets (structured as annuities) start at zero for all households. Consumption
in year 1 is calculated as the dierence in income and mortgage payments subject to the
$1000 subsistence requirement:
ci1 = maxfyi1   Pay
mortgage
i1 ;1000g
Years: 2  t  T
Timing Within a given year the timing follows:
1. Update exogenous state variables (income, home prices, interest rates). Update
home equity changes due to home price changes.
2. Households make moving decision.
393. If move, originate new mortgage, and (if excess equity from sale of home) structure
new annuity.
4. Make mortgage payments, receive annuity payments, update remaining mortgage
and annuity principal, and compute consumption.
5. In nal year t = T calculate bequest
Moving decisions Households upgrade or downgrade according to the probabilities in the
multinomial logit equation (5) and make an adjustment size according to equation (6).
Mortgage Origination If the household moves they originate a new 30 year xed interest
rate mortgage locked at the current period real interest rate. They pay a transaction cost
equal to six percent of the value of the new home. They roll the home equity qit from the








If the principal is calculated as a negative amount (as could happen if the household
downgrades), the household does not originate a mortgage and the excess balance is
placed in an annuity. We do not directly impose a downpayment constraint. If the
household does not move, it does not originate a new mortgage.
Annuity If the household makes a suciently large downgrade such that the proceeds from
the sale of the previous home exceeds the purchase price of the new home and transaction
cost of moving, the excess proceeds are placed in a new annuity. Any remaining principal
from a previously held annuity, Pr
annuity;r
it 1 is rolled into the new annuity. The principal
on a new annuity Pr
annuity;0
it is calculated as:
Pr
annuity;0
it = maxf0;1(moveit)1(qit   1:06pithit > 0)(qit   1:06pithit + Pr
annuity;r
it 1 )g
The indicator variables 1() indicate whether the household just moved and whether the
sale of the previous home generated excess proceeds. Households that do not move or
move and do not have excess proceeds do not structure a new annuity. The remaining
principal from a previous annuity is not used to reduce the principal on a newly originated
mortgage. The interest rate is xed at the interest rate in the year in which the annuity is
structured. The amortization term expires at the end of the life cycle. Annuity payments
are made annually to supplement income. We calculate annuity payments Pay
annuity
it
and update remaining annuity principal using standard annuity formulas with annually
40compounding interest.
Mortgage calculations We calculate mortgage payments and update the remaining mort-
gage principal using standard mortgage formulas with annually compounding interest (as
opposed to daily or continuous compounding). The calculations are based on the principal
and interest rate in the year in which the mortgage was originated. All households with
a mortgage, including those that just moved, make a mortgage payment. After adjusting
the remaining mortgage balance we update home equity due to the payo of principal.
Consumption We calculate consumption as the dierence between income (both labor and
annuity payments) and mortgage payments subject to the $1000 subsistence requirement.





Bequest At the very end of the last year of the life cycle in year t = T, households make a
bequest biT equal to their home equity, subject to a $100 minimum bequest.
biT = maxfqiT;100g
Note that annuity principal is not part of the bequest because it has been fully run down
to zero by the end of the life cycle.
12.3 Alternative Policy Functions
We forward simulate and calculate expected discounted utility for each household under 22
alternative policy functions. We use three types of alternatives.
1. Perturbations of multinomial logit model parameters
2. Move in xed yearly intervals
3. End of life cycle home equity adjustments
Perturbations of multinomial logit model parameters For the rst set of alternative
policy functions, we perturb the parameters in the multinomial logit model of moving
decisions. We uniformly draw alternative parameters around the estimated parameters 
as depicted in table 11.
We do not perturb the remaining parameters on high equity, age, and age-squared. Apart
from the dierent parameters, the forward simulation procedure is the same as in the
optimal policy. With probability 0.7 we select this type of alternative.
41Table 11: Parameter Perturbations for Alternative Policies
Range
Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound
Income upgrade 0.65 1.35
Income downgrade 0.65 1.35
Homesize upgrade 0.65 1.35
Homesize downgrade 0.65 1.35
User cost upgrade -0.04+ 0.03+
User cost downgrade -0.04+ 0.03+
Low Equity upgrade 0.60 1.40
Low Equity downgrade 0.60 1.40
Constant upgrade -0.30+ 0.30+
Constant downgrade 0.90 1.10
Move in xed yearly intervals For the second set of alternative policy functions, house-
holds move in xed yearly intervals. In year 2, the household moves to a home with size
proportional to its year 2 income, initial home size to income ratio, and a scaling factor




In xed yearly intervals,  that range between  = 3 and  = 10 years after year 2, the








Mortgages, annuity, and consumption calculations are otherwise the same as in the opti-
mal policy function. With probability 0.3 we select this type of alternative.
End of life cycle home equity adjustments For the third type of alternative, we allow
households to add to or deplete home equity at the end of the life cycle. For all ages from
age 64 to the end of the life cycle (age 70), the household adjusts home equity by a ratio




The adjusted home equity, qnew
it is calculated at the end of a year after making a mortgage
payment. If equity is positive, the household adds to home equity for i > 1 and depletes
home equity for i < 1. Depleted equity supplements income and added equity is deducted
42from income. We calculate consumption as:







Equity adjustments do not aect mortgages or annuities. Thus, added equity is not used
to pre pay a mortgage and can instead be interpreted to sit in a non-interest bearing
account. With probability 0.3 we select this type of alternative to use in combination
with the 1st and 2nd alternatives.
12.4 Second Stage
We randomly select with replacement a sample of 450 observations. We minimize the objec-
tive function as described in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) using Matlab's simplex based
minimization routine fminsearch. We experimented with alternative starting values and always
converged to the same estimates. On an earlier and slightly dierent variant of the model, we
validated the minimization routine using a grid search. We use a resampling bootstrap proce-
dure to compute standard errors. We randomly select with replacement 100 dierent samples
of size 450. We do not bootstrap the rst stage and thus do not account for rst stage error.
That is, we use the same point estimates in the policy functions and exogenous state variable
processes in the resampling procedure.
43